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Managerial workarounds in three European DRG systems 
Many attempts to increase healthcare providers’ efficiency and contain the growth of costs 
have included a policy of paying healthcare providers through a DRG system. In practice that has 
involved managerial workarounds at the payer-provider interface. Unlike clinical and IT 
workarounds, managerial workarounds at organisational and inter-organisational level have seldom 
been analysed. This paper’s original contribution is to extend the concept the workaround for 
application to managerial activities. It exposes some implications for health policy, including the 
transformation of health systems by means of DRG payment systems. First we abstract the generic 
characteristics, antecedents and consequences attributed to workarounds at work-process level. Next 
we infer what the corresponding characteristics, antecedents and consequences would be, for 
managerial activity. We then apply that conceptualisation empirically to analyse data about DRG 
payment systems for hospitals in England, Germany and Italy. The policy rationales and 
consequences of these three DRG systems are more widely reported than the managerial 
workarounds which help them operate, so we also add that analysis to the empirical literature. In 
light of our empirical findings we refine and adjust our initial conceptualisation of managerial 
workarounds. We conclude that research into health system transformation, policy conflicts and 
implementation deficits can be made more nuanced and diagnostic by the adding the concept of the 
‘managerial workaround’ to the analytic and diagnostic repertoire. 
Background 
The Prototype: Work-Process Workarounds
Workarounds are the ways in which individual workers or work-groups informally by-pass or 
alter the ways in which a formalised work-process is executed, so that they can fulfil its task in 
another way (Halbesleben et al., 2008). Studies of clinical and healthcare IT workarounds have 
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mostly focused on the informal modification, even subversion, of officially-sanctioned work-
processes (De Bono et al., 2010; Halbesleben et al., 2008), for example in nursing (De Bono et al., 
2013), perating theatre safety (Reason, 2005), or the use of electronic patient records (Bar-Lev, 
2015). Work-processes are anyway typically discretionary: within limits, workers adjust them 
according to circumstances. Workarounds however adjust them further, beyond officially-
prescribed boundaries, to create informal, unauthorised improvisations that replace official rules 
and work-processes with alternatives that the improviser thinks are more effective or practicable. 
Often workarounds emerge as improvised repairs of ill-designed, incomplete, impracticable, over-
restrictive or otherwise dysfunctional work-processes (Bar-Lev, 2015; Vogelsmeier et al., 2008) 
which make complex tasks still more difficult (De Bono et al., 2013). Generally workarounds are 
responses to organisational problems (Lalley and Malloch, 2010) (e.g. inter-professional or inter-
departmental boundaries, role ambiguity), practical inadequacies of new technologies (Coiera, 
2007), over-work (Guédon et al., 2017), inflexible rules or communication blockages (De Bono et 
al., 2013). 
Such workarounds therefore have four main characteristics. They firstly extend a work 
process (e.g. using paper alongside electronic records (Ellingsen et al., 2013)) or partly transfer it to 
another profession (Reiz and Gewald, 2016). Such extensions may then require non-standard use of 
the ‘boundary objects’ used to structure and coordinate work across professional and organisational 
boundaries (e.g. adding free-text notes to checklists) (Bar-Lev, 2015), stretching discretion or 
exploiting under-definitions of work routines (e.g. making observations instead of asking the patient 
about her pain (Wallenburg et al., 2019)), re-sequencing tasks (e.g. recording a patient as having 
taken medication before she took it) (Koppel et al., 2008), or using resources intended for one 
work-process for another (e.g. ‘off-label’ prescribing: using a medicine to treat conditions for which 
is is not licensed). Clinicians may employ their own, alternative diagnostic typologies, recording a 
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more acceptable or lucrative diagnosis on official paperwork and negotiating diagnoses with 
patients (Whooley, 2010). These extensions enable staff to use a work-process more widely than 
managers intended or for additional purposes (e.g. prescribing a placebo). 
Secondly, other parts of a work-process may either be used less than officially intended or 
simply ignored, e.g. by disabling warning or safety equipment, or disregarding its warnings 
(Vogelsmeier et al., 2008). Staff may omit elements (Halbesleben et al., 2008; Koppel et al., 2008) 
that appear unnecessarily laborious (e.g. using voice-recorders instead of typing (Reiz and Gewald, 
2016)). 
Workarounds are, thirdly, organised informally. Some are enacted individually and others 
collectively, whether by tacit agreement (De Bono et al., 2013) or explicit negotiation (Ellingsen et 
al., 2013), e.g. to defend professional 'autonomy'. When managers do not just ignore, or even 
promote (Cresswell et al., 2016), them workarounds usually incur lower penalties for a worker than 
overt resistance will. 
Fourthly, the purposes of workarounds are overcome the above problems so that the work-
process achieves its aims more fully and reliably. Some writers describe workarounds as 'violations' 
(Reason, 2005), ‘resistance’ (Reiz and Gewald, 2016), or circumventing the systems for 
maintaining service quality and safety (Guédon et al., 2017), as error-creating (Koppel et al., 2008) 
or as obstacles to systematic problem-solving. Far from instantiating error, laziness, self-interest, 
neglect or incompetence, however, many workarounds are ‘reinventions’ (Barrett and Stephens, 
2017) which improve work-process resilience (Alper and Karsh, 2009), even at some cost for the 
improvisers themselves and if one workaround then necessitates others (Ellingsen et al., 2013). 
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Kobayashi et al. (2005) suggest that workarounds are temporary, but those which introduce 
demonstrably better work processes may gradually become normal working practice (Vogelsmeier 
et al., 2008; Zhou et al., 2011), because they get the work done (De Bono et al., 2013). 
Managerial Work-Arounds
Managerial routines are above all the second-order routines through which managers 
coordinate, control, resource and monitor the activities of those who execute the technical, first-
order work-processes discussed above.  To do so, managers typically use tailored combinations of 
persuasion, financial or other incentives, resource-allocation, delegating responsibility, relationality, 
coercion and work-monitoring. Managerial workarounds would affect the work of implementing 
policy mandates, whether national policy or organisational-level priorities, rather than clinical 
work; and affect organisational- and inter-organisational information flows. A repeat search (28th 
November 2019) of Google Scholar for English-language journal papers published during 2009-
2019 which contained the phrase ‘managerial workaround’ or ‘management workaround’ (or 
‘work-around’, in either) still yielded just 15 hits, eight concerning IT only, four work-processes 
only, one accounting systems only, and two concerning household or family firm settings: too little 
material for a systematic review. We had to develop the concept of a managerial workaround almost 
from scratch. 
Transposing the above analysis of work-process workarounds onto managerial activity, one 
would expect managerial workarounds to occur when managers perceived the mandate as: 
 1. Relying on missing or unreliable organisational structures or systems, e.g. for information-
sharing, staff deployment or procurement.
 2. Facing organisational obstacles or resistance. 
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 3. Having to be implemented through, or despite, restrictive regulations. 
 4. Threatening managers’ occupational interests (e.g. power, income, status). 
 5. Involving conflicting objectives and incentives, so that implementing one policy obstructs 
another. 
 6. Involving difficult, complex tasks depending on factors that the managers cannot fully 
control or predict. 
 
Correspondingly one would predict that managerial workarounds would extend formal 
organisational or inter-organisational structures and managerial practices, using them for additional 
purposes than mandated. Then, managers would use their managerial discretion maximally, use 
resources intended for one use also for another, and adjust what organisational-level monitoring 
systems report and how managers responded. Inter-organisational relationships, co-ordination 
mechanisms and boundary objects would be similarly altered and re-used. Concomitantly the use of 
other organisational or inter-organisational structures and managerial practices might diminish. 
Managers would implement (or only symbolically implement) what they regarded as laborious, 
redundant or perverse elements of a mandate. Like technical workarounds, managerial ones would 
be initiated and established informally, by tacit agreement or explicit negotiation, whether enacted 
individually or collectively. 
Such managerial workarounds would serve the purpose of increasing the practical resilience 
of existing organisational and inter-organisational structures, and of enhancing policy 
implementation. Their character is therefore likely also to reflect their particular organisational, 
health-system and policy context. Work-process workarounds apply only to practitioners’ activities 
within provider organisations, but managerial workarounds develop as much in payer as provider 
organisations. Since work-process workarounds are claimed to frustrate policy-driven attempts to 
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make healthcare safer and of higher quality, the question arises of whether managerial 
workarounds, analogously, frustrate policy attempts to transform health systems. 
DRG systems: incubator for managerial workarounds?
In the 1990s many European health systems were being transformed into more market-like 
structures to make them more manageable, contain the growth of healthcare spending, promote 
competition and open healthcare provision to a wider range of providers (corporate, not-for-profit, 
owner-managed etc.). One consequence was to adopt DRGs as the main pricing unit for hospital 
services. Each DRG groups together clinical diagnoses (usually from the International 
Classification of Diseases) on the basis first of broad clinical speciality ('Major Diagnostic 
Category'), then whether surgical or non-surgical treatment is usual, and then by other 
characteristics, varying by country, which predict the total cost of care for the patients so diagnosed 
(e.g. length of stay). Each DRG is thus approximately homogeneous in terms of treatment costs 
within that country (Busse et al., 2013). DRGs thereby commodify healthcare in the sense of 
standardising the definitions of care groups and setting one standard price for each. We define a 
DRG system as the set of managerial arrangements and organisational structures that produces these 
groupings, allocates a corresponding price (‘tariff’) to each, and contracts, monitors and pays 
healthcare providers accordingly. DRG systems have at least four characteristics which, the above 
suggests, are likely to necessitate managerial workarounds. 
First, policy makers in several countries (e.g. England, Germany, the Netherlands, Greece) 
have tried to design DRG systems to achieve two somewhat conflicting aims. One was to make the 
costs of healthcare to payers more predictable and manageable (Covaleski et al., 1993), make 
providers more accountable to payers, and prevent over-charging (Polyzos et al., 2013) by setting 
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payment tariffs prospectively instead of reimbursing providers' actual costs retrospectively. 
However DRG systems also incentivised providers to increase both the number of cases treated and 
treatment intensity. Evidence from Europe and Australia, but less so from the USA (where DRGs 
replaced fee-for-service payments which were already an incentive to increase activity), tended to 
indicate increased hospital activity volumes and/or intensity following DRG introduction (Krabbe-
Alkemade et al., 2017; Street et al., 2011). Expanding healthcare budgets relieved the tension 
between cost control and incentives for provider activity but the 2008 financial crisis exacerbated it. 
DRG systems secondly allowed providers scope for flexibility and innovation by setting a 
cost ceiling beneath which providers were free to reduce their costs, whether by of reducing capital 
intensity, using less labour, de-skilling, adopting new models of care, selecting patients or shifting 
costs elsewhere (e.g. to patients, when reducing lengths of stay) (Schreyögg et al., 2006). (To stop 
hospitals reducing lengths of stay too much, many DRG systems pay the hospital nothing more if a 
patient is re-admitted for treatment for the same condit on too soon after discharge (30 days in 
England and Germany).) Nevertheless, differential innovation is likely to make health system 
behaviour less predictable overall, and a guaranteed DRG payment means that any savings all 
accrue to providers not payers. 
With other concurrent healthcare reforms a DRG system tended, and in some European 
countries was intended, to promote competition. On the payer side, DRGs were originally designed 
for subscriber-based healthcare insurance markets or quasi-markets, including those where a third 
party (government, social health insurer, employer or corporate insurer) often pays on the patient's 
behalf. The reforms which promoted DRG systems were also intended, in Germany and the 
Netherlands, to stimulate competition between the social health insurers (SHI). On the provider 
side, DRG systems were intended to stimulate yard-stick competition between providers (in 
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England and Germany regional and national comparisons of providers are the yard-sticks), on the 
basis of quality rather than cost. Whatever its benefits, competition might also be expected to make 
overall health system behaviour less stable, predictable and manageable. 
Last, a DRG system is highly structured, being implemented through a complex, voluminous 
system of rules, regulations and calculations which must all be reviewed and updated regularly as 
clinical classifications, working practices, costs and technologies change. 
Other possible antecedents of managerial workarounds do not so obviously apply to DRG 
systems. As noted, DRG systems tend to have extensive rather than missing regulations, 
organisational structures and information systems, and if anything tend to support rather than 
threaten managers’ occupational interests. Because DRG systems alter some of the demarcations 
between managers and clinicians, clinicians might be expected to resist them. Yet reports of such 
resistance to DRGs themselves are rare, partly, perhaps, because DRGs were designed to be 
intelligible and meaningful to clinicians. Nevertheless, sufficient antecedents do apply, to make it 
likely that DRG systems will incubate managerial workarounds. For example, studies already report 
providers up-coding patients to more lucrative tariffs (‘DRG creep') and supernumerary 
negotiations about outlier patients (Cots et al., 2011). If we wish to discover whether the concept of 
a managerial workaround has empirical application, DRG systems would be a good place to look. 
Research Questions
Using data about three DRG systems we therefore consider: 
1. To what extent is the concept of ‘managerial workaround’ capable of empirical application, 
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particularly to inter-organisational relationships between payers and providers? 
Insofar as it is applicable: 
2. What are the characteristics of such managerial workarounds? 
3. What antecedents or circumstances motivate them? 
4. What does the concept of ‘managerial workaround’ imply for health policy analysis, hence 
policy formulation? 
Methods 
Research Design
The study design was to make a qualitative test of the foregoing assumptions about the 
antecedents, character and consequences of managerial workarounds. The concept of a managerial 
workaround centres on the contrast between the official formulation of a policy mandate or local 
managerial priorities, and the partly contrasting activities that its implementers undertake in 
practice. We elicited policy-makers' stated intentions (summarised above) for their DRG systems 
from published policy documents and interviews with informants in the relevant national-level 
(England, Germany) and regional bodies (Italy). The researchers undertook this work in the 
respective languages. As evidence about how the system was implemented, and any workarounds, 
we use data from a larger study of how healthcare payers exercise governance over service 
providers (full research report obtainable from the authors). 
Sampling
DRG systems have the same basic architecture but some technical and implementation details 
differ between health systems. Italy and England are Beveridge health systems which have adopted 
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DRG payments to hospitals, Germany the paradigm Bismarckian health system to do so. German 
DRGs modify the Australian AR-DRG system. Italian DRGs followed the US (HCFA) model as 
did English HRGs (but less closely). By contrasting these systems, we aimed to elicit which 
practices, including workarounds, for implementing DRGs were specific to one particular health 
system and which were common to all three, hence likely to reflect the nature of DRG systems per 
se. 
Our sampling strategy was to select study sites which by the standards of their respective 
health systems had well-developed DRG systems. What that criterion meant in concrete terms 
differed for each country. In England, Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCG) 'commission', i.e. 
select, contract and pay, providers. We selected early-established ones as likely to have the most 
developed commissioning systems. (CCGs replaced the essentially similar Primary Care Trusts 
after 2013. In our study sites, their geographical configuration and membership had not changed.) 
For Germany we selected the SHI whose DRG systems appeared to have most developed 
negotiating, informatics, monitoring and research capacity, and for Italy the province making the 
most extensive use of DRGs. Our study sites were: 
  Four English CCGs which together covered the range of  CCG organisational structures, of 
degree of local hospital competition (by Herfindahl-Hirschmann index) and extent of 
collaboration with neighbouring CCGs. 
  A large German SHI covering the whole country (over 7 million members) and having over 
100 years’ experience as a payer. 
  Lombardy health region, the first (1995), and when we started fieldwork only, Italian region 
using DRGs as its main hospital payment system.  
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Data Collection
We used similar data collection methods in each country, but (as the funder required) more 
extensively in England. In each site we assembled a sample of key informants by snowballing from 
the most senior commissioning managers, who identified their counterpart lead clinicians and 
managers in secondary care providers and, as applicable, other organisations involved in the 
payment system (e.g. at national and/or regional government levels). Since workarounds involve 
adapting and supplementing official policies, rules and working-processes, they were more likely to 
be reported in interviews, media rapportage and the action learning sets which ran in parallel with 
this research (see below) than in official policy documents. Official documents and press 
rapportage, however, offer the most direct account of the DRG system's policy rationale. We 
conducted key informant interviews (20 in Germany, 24 in Italy, 110 in England) of managers using 
DRGs at provider (N=45) and payer (N=109) levels, content-analysed key policy and guidance 
documents (39 in Germany, 14 in Italy, 57 in England; and for one German hospital, an anonymised 
set of their standard contract documents), press rapportage and published papers. Our informants 
identified for us the policy and guidance documents most most relevant to them, and some 
published studies and press rapportage. We found further published papers and rapportage by 
keyword searches of on-line databases (e.g. PubMed) and reference-chasing from grey studies (e.g. 
WHO country reports). There were two main rounds of data collection, the first and larger in 2010-
13 with a second round of supplementary data collection from key informants and administrative 
documents during 2018-19 to re-verify, update and extend our data and findings about all three 
DRG systems. 
We ran an action learning set (in effect, a focus-group of practitioners) in which informants 
from the three countries exchanged information and ideas about how they paid for healthcare in 
practice. One clinician and one manager from each of the English study sites participated in a 
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preliminary set of five workshops. This led to a mini-conference in which informants from 
Germany and Italy joined the set to exchange updates and practical ideas. The participants agreed 
conclusions at each meeting, and from the action learning set overall. Three of the researchers were 
facilitators and recorded the findings and conclusions on each occasion. 
Analysis
To compare DRG systems systematically required a common analytic framework and 
therefore a framework analysis, assembling the data from all sources from all three countries. This 
was logically equivalent into tabulating the data with one (virtual) column per country and one 
(virtual) row per research question, followed by sub-analysing the findings for each research 
question into sub-themes. Juxtaposing data from the different sources for each country gave an 
immediate triangulation, exposing gaps, ambiguities or apparent contradictions in the data, thereby 
prompting additional data collection. So far as possible we analysed transcripts and texts directly in 
the original language, to avoid the mistake of re-framing findings from one system with concepts 
that only apply elsewhere (e.g. the term ‘commissioning’ has no precise German or Italian 
equivalent). The patterns in each virtual row answered our research questions, but also exposed 
where the inference of new categories or concepts was required to accommodate unforeseen 
empirical findings. That, indeed, was what suggested the distinction between IT or clinician-level 
workarounds and managerial workarounds, leading to inference of the further patterns reported 
below and which structure this paper as a whole. 
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Ethics
An NHS Research Ethics Committee gave ethical approval (reference 09/H0206/50) for 
fieldwork in England, the University of Plymouth for fieldwork elsewhere, subject to informants 
remaining anonymous. 
Findings 
Space limitations compel us mostly to narrate rather than quote the informants’ data. Fuller 
details, including many quotations from interview audio-recordings, are however in the full research 
report available from the authors. 
System settings and policy problems
Although the German SHIs are largely self-financing (albeit with some government subsidy), 
recent health policy has emphasised cost containment. Federal bodies annually set workers’ and 
employers’ SHI contribution rates, which constrains the SHIs’ global budget. The German DRG 
system reimburses the running costs of inpatient care but Land (province) governments remain 
responsible for hospital investment, hence each hospital’s bed allocation. Unlike American but like 
English and Italian practice, DRGs include the cost of doctors’ work. Every DRG has a point 
weighting. Each point earns a fixed number of Euros. The conversion-rate differs Land by Land. 
Each hospital is entitled to payment for as many cases as it can attract. Generally the SHIs wish to 
avoid patient numbers, hence costs, rising uncontrollably and therefore require a way to mitigate the 
financial incentives that the DRG system gives hospitals (Vogl, 2013) for case-splitting (dividing 
up one episode into several, each with its own DRG), up-coding (Jürges and Köberlein, 2015), 
increasing activity, and even over-treatment. For example an early study in cardiology, which 
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accounts for about 10% of hospital spending, found that 56% of angioplasties were done in patients 
with stable, chronic angina, where angioplasty is not useful (indeed potentially harmful) (Dissmann 
and de Ridder, 2002). As another example, hospitals can claim additional reimbursement if they can 
document nursing services additional to those covered by procedure code OPS 9-200 for extensive 
nursing care. The Medizinische Dienst der Krankenkassen, which verifies DRG payments to 
hospitals, reports widespread overcharging although our SHI informants said that this is usually due 
to mis-coding or mis-diagnosis; some hospitals mis-code nearly a third of cases but those that do 
then face delayed payment, even cash-flow problems. 
In the Italian DRG system, regions are the main payer, with considerable regional variation in 
how they use DRGs. Even in the relatively wealthy region we studied, pressures for cost control 
have increased, and in 2019 it remains a national policy priority. Most Italian NHS services were 
reimbursed retrospectively through DRG-based tariffs, to reflect patient and GP choices of provider. 
As in Germany and the Netherlands (Krabbe-Alkemade et al., 2017), introduction of the DRG 
system was associated with a decrease in hospital admissions and length of stay, an increase in day-
hospital admissions and greater severity of illness among hospitalised patients (Louis et al., 1999). 
The English 'Payment by Results' (PBR) system uses Health Resource Groups (HRGs). 
CCGs, nominally controlled by GPs, were the main payers. HRGs were defined independently of 
the US prototype but with an essentially DRG-like design and similar policy rationales, in part to 
increase provider activity so as to reduce hospital waiting lists, a politically sensitive issue in the 
UK. Our informants also reported that HRGs incentivised hospitals to treat more cases and more 
intensive treatments, although hospitals' rising marginal costs (e.g. for opening operating theatres at 
week-ends) limited the expansion. Our commissioner informants claimed that treatment thresholds 
had fallen and up-coding had appeared. Health policy pressures to contain NHS costs were strong in 
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our English study sites. Combined with patients' rights to use 'Any Qualified Provider', the HRG 
tariff system weakened the commissioners' power to control provider case load and case mix, hence 
overall costs. 
Across all three countries the DRG system posed a similar complex of problems. It 
incentivised hospitals to increase their volume and intensity of treatments (and ‘game’ the 
administration of payments); and to reduce the costs of each treatment, but that meant costs to the 
hospital not costs for the payers. Costs for the payers simply rose, the reverse of national policies 
for containing the overall growth of healthcare costs. 
a.  Extending the DRG system
Our German SHI and hospital manager informants described how SHIs work around the 
adverse incentive effects of the DRG system by negotiating collectively with each hospital, 
focusing on spreadsheets that predict the number and case-mix of DRGs for the coming year, which 
implies a DRG points allocation for the hospital. Hospitals’ ‘medical control units’ calculate the 
costs and prepare the negotiations with the SHIs. In past years the negotiation had been based on 
historic case-loads, but had become increasingly guided by the SHIs’ wishes to save costs, shape 
services regionally and contain service expansion. Around the agreed number of DRG points a 
'corridor' (Flur) was also agreed, defining an upper and lower limit of the number of cases for each 
main group of DRGs. The parties also agreed what rebates the SHI will receive should the volume 
or case-mix fall below that range and what payment the hospital would receive for justified 
additional work above it. These agreements imply notional budgets for each main area of hospital 
work. This practice gives a concrete, detailed way of modelling and managing hospital activity, 
case mix and revenue costs. It is possible to reduce or remove specific kinds of case, even whole 
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departments, by reallocations within the total number of points, but the total tends to be an 
incremental increase on the previous year's figure, constrained within the ‘corridors’. Thus SHIs 
'bundle' payments in large groups in the interest of cost-containment, whilst for hospitals DRG 
bundling forestalled external micro-scrutiny of their internal activities and gave a stable, predictable 
route to such increases in income as the payers could offer. 
The Lombardy regional government’s only lever of cost control through the DRG system was 
to vary DRG tariff rates and adjust the production ceiling stated in the contract with providers, i.e. 
the levels of activity at which non-standard tariff payments are made. As cost-control pressures 
increased, ‘ceiling budgets’ were introduced into provider contracts, enforced by tariff caps should 
service use exceed the planned budget. For ambulatory and diagnostic services, a provider was 
guaranteed 95% of the previous year’s expenditure and case load. For activity between 97% and 
103% of the latter, the tariff was cut by 30%; for activity at 103% to 106% above the previous year 
the tariff was cut by 60%; and above that the tariff was zero. This arrangement incentivised 
providers to achieve the 106% level, so as to grow the next year’s baseline budget. By setting a zero 
marginal tariff for case-load above 106% of what had been agreed at the start of each 
commissioning cycle, the Lombardy commissioners contained costs by in effect constructing hybrid 
of cost-and-volume (below the 106% level) and global ('block') contracts (above 106%). All Italian 
regions use ceiling budgets, although the ceiling levels vary. 
In England, the study site commissioners worked around the incentive effects of HRGs by 
collecting tariff payments into blocks, creating what they called the ‘cap-and-collar’ or ‘managed 
PBR’ system. If provider activity fell below a certain ‘floor’ or (more likely) exceeded a certain 
‘ceiling’ (in our London site, 5% above the expected case-load), tariff payments for the marginal 
activity were reduced by an agreed amount, in one study site to zero. The only exception to this 
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pattern was that one study commissioner changed its de facto global contract with a private hospital 
to HRG tariff payments, a movement in the opposite direction. Overall, though, the predominant 
response was to bundle tariff payments in order to dampen what were, for payers, perverse 
incentive effects. At national level, a shift towards lower, ‘best-practice’ tariff prices (based on 
costs in the most efficient, not average, hospitals) was announced. Hospital managers’ reactions 
were mixed. They all entered into negotiations with payers, based on the ‘cap-and-collar’ 
workaround. However in one outer London CCG, the main hospital agreed a reduced volume of 
elective activity, but then still deliberately provided more services than agreed, presenting the CCG 
with a fait accompli and corresponding bill. Both in our study sites and elsewhere NHS hospitals 
tried (and sometimes managed) to move into and out of ‘cap and collar’ arrangements according to 
their short-term financial interests. 
Health managers in all three systems thus independently invented almost exactly the same 
work-around to reduce DRGs’ upward pressure on healthcare costs. 
A second German workaround was selective or 'rebate' contracts, which German SHIs have 
offered since 1998. As with some forms of American 'managed care', patients who opt into these 
these contracts have a restricted choice of providers in return for lower subscriptions. The selected 
providers get a lower DRG payment per case in return for a larger case-load. Patients must opt into 
these and into integrated care programmes, but many patients assumed that only providers with 
difficulty attracting patients accepted such contracts. Where they did not have latitude to vary the 
tariff system, the Lombardy commissioners also tried to influence patients', and still more GPs', 
choice of hospital, including attempts to reduce cross-boundary patient flows, especially for highly 
specialized services (e.g. neurosurgery). (Cross-boundary flow was also an issue in Emilia 
Romagna.) For example Mantova ASL, on the border with the Emilia Romagna and Veneto 
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regions, introduced training schemes encouraging GPs to meet their patients’ diagnostic and 
specialised ambulatory care needs within the region; and created an incentive for hospitals to hire 
specialists to treat such patients. Although for planned treatments English NHS patients choose their 
hospital, the reality in our study sites (and most of the UK) was that the payers and GPs relied on 
just one hospital for about two-thirds of their secondary care, although for certain low- to medium-
complexity planned treatments some corporate and not-for-profit hospitals also treated NHS 
patients under contract. However, non-local and non-NHS hospitals were by default paid the full 
DRG tariff so diverting patients there would not reduce costs for the payers. The patient-diversion 
workaround thus appeared in Germany and Italy but not England. 
 
Diminutions of the DRG system
Concomitantly, the study sites limited the commodification of care. As noted, payers and 
providers agreed standard payments only for cases within the ‘corridor’ (see above), with lower 
payments for those above or below. 
Another way of de-commodifying DRG payments was to ‘bundle’ them. Patients with 
multiple, especially long-term, conditions often require care from a network of different services. 
DRGs are designed for funding payments to a single provider, not networks of multiple providers. 
Some German SHIs therefore attempted to introduce disease-management programmes (Kifmann, 
2017) providing preventive case management and continuous care for certain chronic conditions 
(e.g. diabetes, COPD, depression, alcoholism). However 
 'this most of the time only takes place in very classical incidents such as knee, hips etc, that 
are of an orthopaedic nature. These are relatively easy to make and are all plannable 
operations that happen very often. For more complicated courses of treatment, there is 
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much less' (SHI manager). 
Some of these projects experimentally constructed inter-organisational care pathways linking 
primary and secondary care for certain patient groups, a few including many providers but most 
only two. Even then, because of the bilateral character of DRG payments, these networks required 
specially negotiated contracts rather than the usual DRG payments. Another work-around is also 
required from the provider side: to integrate the data about its patients, who collectively may 
subscribe to several different SHIs (Hildebrandt et al., 2010). In some of these Integrierte 
Versorgung (‘integrated care’) contracts the DRG price-limit for treatments was also waived. 
Indeed, a separate payment system was authorised for networks from 2012. However, as with 
DRGs these contracts had to be re-negotiated annually, causing high transaction costs for SHIs. 
Some 14,000 such schemes existed by 2010 but, because patients had to opt in, only about 5.5% of 
people were then enrolled in them, representing about 1% of healthcare spending. Patients appear 
somewhat sceptical of them (Amelung et al., 2012). Cost savings were claimed for 85% of the 
integrated care schemes (Kielstra, 2011) but in Germany the SHIs also operate the sickness benefit 
scheme, which is where the savings would usually materialise. 
English payers also wanted to work around the difficulty of paying the networks of providers 
which patients with mental health problems and other chronic conditions often require. CCGs did so 
by arranging for providers’ representatives to meet in order to negotiate the assembly of coordinated 
care pathways, constituting a care network. They called this 'micro-commissioning', and regarded it 
as a method of primary care integration. CCGs influenced these service providers primarily through 
negotiation and persuasion, not the payment system. One CCG engaged an American HMO to help 
its general practices redesign services for these care groups, building in risk assessment and 
telephone support services. Some CCGs outside our study sites experimentally used ‘year-of-care’ 
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payments which in effect bundled the HRG payments for chronic disease into annual capitation 
payments. 
In Lombardy, payments for these kinds of services were simply outside the DRG system 
altogether. Even for hospital care, a controversial workaround in Lombardy was to supplement 
DRGs with ‘Functions with no tariff’ (Funzioni non tariffate: FNT) payments to reimburse 
activities that lacked DRG tariffs or that it was considered undesirable to limit access to (e.g. A&E 
services, dialysis, foetal and neonatal pathology). FNTs were variable and at Regional Authority 
discretion. It can be argued that they represented a system of risk-adjustment payments for 
corporate and non-profit hospitals that could not access other public funds. FNTs were also used for 
ex-post funding, typically to help public hospitals that had exceeded their budgets. However the 
unclear legal status of FNTs had also created gaming problems so from 2015 the Regional 
Authority began to replace them by supplementing the original DRG system with further new 
DRGs of its own: a new workaround to reduce gaming and grey areas, and make the payment 
system more consistent across private, public and non-for-profit providers. The 2015 reforms 
considerably changed regional health system governance and regulation, but nevertheless left the 
DRG system, and its workarounds, still working as described above. In Germany too, annual 
contract negotiations had to cover payments for new treatments not yet in the DRG system 
In contrast to some clinical or IT workarounds, the DRG systems in the countries we studied 
had little obvious impact, good or bad, on the quality of care. German DRGs give the SHIs few 
direct financial incentives to offer hospitals for improving the quality of care, which the 
aforementioned negotiations do not cover. Rather, quality of care is managed when new types of 
treatment are considered for inclusion in the DRG payment scheme. The Gemeine Bundesausschuss 
(national negotiating body for health policy) sets out quality norms and guidelines, and approves 
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new new treatments or diagnostic procedures for temporary, interim payments whilst the are being 
evaluated. Those whose evaluation is positive become eligible for reimbursement through a DRG. 
In 2012 the Lombardy regional government paid a variable premium (adjustment) of plus or minus 
2% of the budget was paid to providers according to their performance against certain quality 
standards, but this was a limited project, directly controlled by the regional general directorates. The 
English HRG system contained no direct incentive for improving or reducing service quality, 
although in one of our study sites the district hospitals wanted to discontinue out-posted clinics in 
small rural community hospitals because HRG payments did not cover the cost, even though the 
commissioner valued these services. When tariff levels exceeded the cost of providing hospital 
services, though, HRGs incentivised hospitals not to transfer services to primary care. In all three 
systems, our informants did not describe any workarounds to the DRG system for the purposes of 
managing the quality of care. 
b.  Informal Organisation
In all three countries, these workarounds were formulated during the contract negotiations 
between managers from the payer and from the provider sides. The NHS negotiations focused, 
informants said, mostly on costs (and waiting times, for one hospital). Over time, trust and goodwill 
accumulated. The negotiators recognised that they would need each other’s help and goodwill in 
future. A cap-and-collar agreement was often linked with other bargains (e.g. letting a hospital close 
beds provided that its activity levels stayed above the ‘collar’). In our German site the SHIs 
negotiated collectively with each hospital. Negotiations focused on the hospital’s DRG points 
allocation, case mix and the nationally defined growth margin, which together implied an overall 
number of DRG points and therefore budget. It was possible to enlarge or add, reduce or even 
remove, care-groups by re-allocation within the total number of points, which was how the 
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‘corridor’ was agreed. Lombardy used two kinds of contract. One, with juridical status, stated the 
main rules and quality standards that the provider must comply with but the other, annual 
operati nal contract had no legal status and this was the one which defined the provider’s budget 
and activity level, within local targets set by the Region. These relationships have been described as 
more like a ‘compact’ than a ‘contract’ (Powell, 2007). 
These negotiated arrangements were in all three systems formalised in the sense of being 
explicitly stated and documented but informal in the sense of being unofficial additions to the laws, 
decrees or regulations governing the contracts and their juridical status. 
Discussion
Across the three countries essentially the same managerial workarounds of the DRG system 
emerged. They had no statutory basis, but were enacted collectively and by explicit negotiation. 
Insofar as payer-provider negotiations are inherent to a DRG system, the above workarounds might 
be regarded as an example of managers extending an official inter-organisational structure and 
informational resources for additional uses i.e. system planning and cost control. They exploited 
and stretched managerial discretion. The DRG workarounds did not much alter or supplement what 
organisational-level or inter-organisational monitoring data the managers received, but payer 
managers did make additional, non-standard uses of boundary objects (contracts, spreadsheets, etc.) 
and so widened the possible range of managerial responses to those data. In England and Germany, 
these and other workarounds were used to develop and support emerging inter-provider care 
networks for providing integrated care. However, these managerial workarounds did not have all 
the characteristics that our initial conceptualisation predicted. They added rather than removed 
warning systems and activity over-rides, and increased rather than reduced managerial work. They 
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did not involve alternative diagnostic typologies, nor fudging or re-negotiating diagnostic codes. 
Neither insufficient resources or time for managerial work, nor its over-complexity, motivated the 
workar unds reported above. Neither did any threat to managers’ occupational interests. Given a 
policy mandate for cost control, the workarounds attenuated what payers foresaw (and sometimes 
experienced) as perverse consequences of the DRG system, in the absence of official organisational 
structures or systems for controlling or mitigating these consequences. 
These findings have various limitations and caveats. We report DRG workarounds only for 
three European systems. However DRG system modifications similar to the three we investigated 
have been reported (or rather, mentioned briefly) in studies of Austria, Greece (Polyzos et al., 
2013), Ireland, Portugal, Spain (Catalonia), Sweden, Poland (Kowalska, 2007) and parts of the USA 
(Cutler and Ghosh, 2012). Other writers report the ‘bundling’ of patient episodes, meaning the 
work-around described above which ‘bundles’ together the payments for the multiple patients in the 
same DRG group. Others, especially in the USA but also for example in the Netherlands (Bakker et 
al., 2012), use the term ‘bundle’ differently to mean combining all the different DRG payments for 
one individual patient who uses multiple providers, similar to the NHS ‘year of care’ model 
described above. Although we have focused on hospital payments, DRG-like systems are 
increasingly being applied to non-hospital services. In many countries DRGs coexist with non-DRG 
or pre-DRG systems (Cots et al., 2011). If workarounds emerge from particular local health system 
settings, our findings may also reflect a specific stage in DRG-system development, perhaps one 
that will pass. We have reported how payers managed DRGs at inter-organisational level and in 
light of broad health policy aims, rather than more technical DRG development such as a new ICD, 
groupers, provider cost accounting systems, ways of converting DRG tariffs into money prices or 
modelling methods. Neither have we considered how hospital competition may affect DRG 
workarounds. We selected payers whose DRG systems were well-developed in terms of their 
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managerial systems, extent and intensity of DRG use. If this selection did bias our findings (which 
is not obvious), the bias would be towards reporting the most extensive and elaborate managerial 
workar unds in each DRG system. Healthcare is not the only sector that incubates managerial 
workarounds (Ledeneva, 2009). Synthesising our findings with those from elsewhere would refine 
the conceptualisations proposed above. 
Conclusion: Managerial workarounds as diagnostic - and remedial? 
Nevertheless this study adds several things to existing knowledge. One is additional evidence 
about the internal workings of DRG systems in three health systems, in particular a workaround 
which is often noticed but seldom deeply examined. So far as we are aware, no other study develops 
the concept of a 'managerial workaround', tests it empirically or explains how managerial 
workarounds occur. In motivation, means and consequences, managerial workarounds differ from 
most forms of policy-practice gap reported in the implementation literature. Managers’ motivation 
was not to make the DRG system do something other than policy-makers intended, as happens 
when non-managers ‘capture’ a policy or when policy goal-displacement (Abramson, 2009) occurs. 
Neither did the present workarounds arise from managers failing to understand how to enact the 
DRG policy, nor from policy ambiguity or mis-specification, for DRG systems are clearly specified 
and highly formalised. Rather the opposite: those making the workarounds intended to achieve 
policy makers’ aims more fully and despite (in this case) some of the incentives arising from the 
commodified character of DRGs. Their motivation was not primarily symbolic (e.g. external image 
management, increasing managerial power over clinicians) as institutionalist theory might suggest 
but concrete and practical (in this case cost control, case-mix and referral planning). It was remedy 
not resistance. 
As means to realise these intentions, the managerial workarounds reported here, like work-
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process workarounds generally, go beyond passive non-implementation, shortcuts (Lalley and 
Malloch, 2010) or just exercising discretion within the structures that a given policy creates. They 
extended the structures that DRG policy introduced. Because these extensions were formalised, 
impersonal and stable, they were capable of becoming normalised (May and Finch, 2009), over 
time, as permanent inter-organisational structures. These developments were indeed emergent, but 
from conflicts between policy goals (stimulating hospital activity versus cost control) not conflicts 
between interest groups or conflicting implementation structures for a single policy. Consequently 
the managerial workarounds ‘decoupled’ organisations’ actual work processes only in a specific, 
restricted way from those organisations’ formal structures and external image presentation 
(Covaleski et al., 1993). Managers’ work-practices were only decoupled from DRGs’ policy-
defeating consequences, not from the normative foundations of the DRG system. Hence the 
managerial workarounds described here should not necessarily be dismissed (as policy-practice 
gaps often are) as implementation failures. Rather, they were implementation repairs. 
Our findings suggest that a widespread managerial workaround may therefore be a response 
to policy incoherence. The workarounds that we report appear to be symptomatic of design 
problems with DRGs, and therefore DRG systems, at a basic level. What motivated the DRG 
workarounds was the practical incompatibility of two policy objectives. One was DRGs’ market-
conformity. DRGs were designed as a commodified payment system (payment per episode of care) 
to incentivise providers to increase activity (and on some definitions, 'efficiency'). The other 
objective was system-wide cost control. To remove that underlying incompatibility would require 
policy shifts, but the managerial workarounds themselves may suggest what shifts. The 
workarounds described above produced provider contracts that retained the informational strengths 
of DRGs, made providers’ expected incomes and case-mix transparent and uniformly-defined 
across providers, whilst also defining the payers’ care costs prospectively and constituting a means 
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of cost control for both payers and providers. The managerial workaround converted DRG 
payments into a specific kind of flexible, weakly incentivised global (‘block’) contract system, a 
hybrid system for assembling flexible global budgets from estimates of patient-level activity and 
DRG payments. 
Health policy researchers who discover pervasive, non-trivial managerial workarounds might 
therefore consider them a prompt to investigate further whether that discovery is symptomatic, in 
turn, of inconsistent policy objectives, or of a conflict between those objectives and the 
organisational structures intended to realise them; but also whether the workarounds themselves 
may contain solutions to these problems. 
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